

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY / MIDDLE EAST UPDATE
June 24 - July 1, 2010

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1. [Obama to Sign Bill on Additional U.S. Sanctions Against Iran \(07-01-2010\)](#)

By Stephen Kaufman
Staff Writer

Washington — President Obama will sign legislation July 1 that expands unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran's energy and financial sectors in response to the country's nuclear activities.

The new measure follows [United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929](#), passed June 9, [U.S. Treasury designations on June 16](#) of additional institutions and individuals that help Iran finance its nuclear and missile programs or evade sanctions against them, and unilateral sanctions adopted June 17 by the European Union and Australia.

The [legislation Obama will sign](#) (PDF, 23KB), passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate on June 24, would exclude from the U.S. market companies involved in selling refined petroleum products to Iran and would prevent foreign banks from accessing the U.S. financial system if they do business with key Iranian institutions or Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps.

According to press reports, U.S. lawmakers deliberately crafted the bill to close enforcement gaps in U.N. sanctions that have allowed Iranian financial institutions identified as being involved with Iranian nuclear and missile activities to continue doing business with companies in Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

In a [June 24 statement](#), House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said the bill is "the strongest Iran sanctions legislation ever passed by Congress," and gives President Obama new tools to "impose sanctions

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against companies that sell Iran technology, services, know-how and materials for its energy and petroleum sector.” It forces foreign banks to choose between doing business with the United States or dealing with institutions that support Iran’s “weapons of mass destruction and terrorist activities,” she said.

On multiple occasions, Iran’s government has demonstrated “its refusal to work in good faith to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and around the world,” Pelosi said. “In the last year, Iran has: concealed major nuclear facilities; repeatedly blocked U.N. nuclear inspectors from doing their job; and openly threatened to, as the Iranian president said quote, ‘wipe Israel off the face of the map,’” she said.

“These actions reflect a clear record of defiance. Now Iran must take steps to demonstrate its willingness to live as a peaceful partner in the international community. And we must all use all the tools at our disposal to stop Iran’s march toward nuclear capability,” Pelosi said.

President Obama plans to sign the legislation at the White House after meeting with Vice President Biden, according to the White House. Under U.S. law, a president has 10 days after Congress passes legislation to either veto it or sign it into law.

White House press secretary [Robert Gibbs praised the measure](#) as “a strong bill that builds upon the recently passed U.N. Security Council resolution, grants the president new authority, and strengthens a multilateral strategy to isolate and pressure Iran.”

“We will continue to work with the Congress ... in our ongoing efforts to hold Iran accountable. As that effort progresses, we will also work with our allies and take independent action under the president’s existing authorities, as we did last week in designating additional entities for sanctions,” Gibbs said.

During a June 22 Senate debate on the bill, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry said Iran is estimated to have approximately 2,400 kilograms of reactor-grade, low-enriched uranium at its Natanz enrichment facility, which is enough material for two nuclear weapons. In addition, the country is believed to have begun enriching small quantities of uranium to a concentration of about 20 percent, crossing a nuclear threshold that experts believe could lead to nuclear weapons production.

A nuclear armed Iran would “[pose an intolerable threat](#)” to the Middle East and undermine global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, Kerry said, urging his colleagues to pass the bill.

“These steps to increase pressure are necessary not because we want to target Iran, but because Iran itself has decided to continue to defy the international community, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. Security Council,” he said.

2. Ambassador Rice at U.N. Security Council Debate on Afghanistan (06-30-2010) **U.S. expresses its gratitude to U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan**

Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Debate on Afghanistan and UNAMA, June 30, 2010

Thank you, Mr. President. And thank you, Special Representative de Mistura, for your comprehensive briefing.

Let me start by underscoring my government's continued full support for the critical role of the United Nations in Afghanistan. We are deeply grateful for the continuing determination and courage of the men and women of the UNAMA, who have demonstrated their deep commitment to helping Afghans achieve stability and build democratic institutions in the face of enormous challenges. Our gratitude is all the greater for having seen their work and those challenges firsthand on the Security Council's trip to Afghanistan last week.

Mr. President, our trip reinforced our strong support for Special Representative de Mistura and his team, who are helping the Government of Afghanistan face its most important and difficult challenges. Their vital work needs resources—especially experienced and capable staff with a wide range of technical expertise. I am grateful to the Special Representative and the UN Secretariat for their work in ensuring that priority positions in Afghanistan are filled. I urge the UN system as a whole to continue to move energetically and creatively to deploy needed staff to Afghanistan.

During our three-and-a-half-day trip, the Security Council saw a proud and determined Afghan people, working together across economic and social sectors and government ministries to build a durable future for their country. When we sat with young Afghan students in a refugee resettlement camp, they described their painful inheritance from three decades of war—but they also spoke compellingly about their ability to shape Afghanistan's political and economic future. Their resilience was inspiring. And such resilience will be Afghanistan's crucial reserve as the country faces the year's challenges.

Mr. President, Afghanistan and the international community are entering a new phase of our partnership, on the way to full Afghan ownership. As a result, the Security Council focused its trip on those elements that will allow the Afghan people to exercise full control over their destiny: choosing their government, beginning a dialogue on the conflict, strengthening their ability to provide security, and fostering economic and political development.

As part of these consultations, the Council looked in depth at the ongoing preparations for the legislative elections scheduled for September. We welcomed the new leadership at the IEC and the reconstituted ECC. The IEC leadership spoke of the lessons learned from the 2009 election and its determination to improve the upcoming election's credibility. The IEC also emphasized the need for increased security for polling sites, noting that they did not plan to open polling stations in insecure areas. Similarly, the ECC's leaders underscored their commitment to act independently. And the United States, for its part, reinforced the importance of the United Nations being prepared to provide enough technical and operational support to meet the IEC and the ECC's needs.

Afghan representatives and government leaders briefed the Security Council on Afghan led reconciliation and reintegration efforts designed to pull insurgent commanders and fighters off the battlefield. President Karzai and others also emphasized in this context the importance of removing names from the Resolution 1267 list. In consultation with other Committee members, we are thoroughly reviewing each and every individual and entity on the list—and determining on a case-by-case basis whether the listings remain appropriate. The United States continues to support delisting reconciled Taliban who cut their ties to al-Qaeda, lay down their arms, and accept the Afghan constitution. The United States also continues to work with our partners on the Committee and in the Afghan government to ensure that the 1267 regime can effectively and accurately list individuals and, when appropriate, remove them. During the trip, Security Council members underscored to our Afghan partners that the Government of Afghanistan providing credible information on each individual being considered for removal from the Consolidated List by the 1267 Committee is vital and urgent and we look forward to that information.

The Council also saw ISAF and NATO's extensive efforts to build a multiethnic national army. The Council visited the Kabul Military Training Center to talk to ISAF and Afghan trainers, and we had the opportunity to see new Afghan National Army recruits from across the country. We learned that recruiting has increased, as has the number of international instructors. Moreover, Afghan soldiers are now being trained and tested against concrete standards, and the crucial non-commissioned officer core is being strengthened.

But much more work still remains to be done. More trainers are needed, both to fulfill existing NATO pledges and to fill gaps. Building self-sustaining, capable Afghan security forces is crucial to a meaningful and sustainable transition to Afghan leadership on security.

Council members also witnessed UN efforts to help returning Afghan refugees at the Sheik Mesri resettlement camp. We were briefed by the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Jalalabad on the ways that civilian officials are partnering with Afghans to develop and implement important initiatives on governance, economic development, the rule of law, and agriculture. These multilateral and bilateral efforts to build economic and political momentum following military actions are crucial to our strategy's long-term success. To ensure that the international community's efforts are effective, the United Nations should continue to promote coordination and unity of effort.

Mr. President, the United States expresses its gratitude to Special Representative de Mistura, to the UN team, and the Turkish delegation for organizing an effective trip to Afghanistan, and to ISAF/NATO for its support and security assistance. We look forward to continuing to work closely with the Special Representative to achieve our shared goal: of helping the people of Afghanistan transform and strengthen their own society and ensure their own security. Finally, let me underscore our profound thanks to President Karzai, Ambassador Tanin, and the rest of the Afghan government, including the Afghan security forces, for hosting such a productive visit and extending such warm hospitality.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3. General Petraeus Testifies on Afghanistan Strategy (06-30-2010)

By Merle David Kellerhals Jr.
Staff Writer

Washington — The U.S. Army general nominated to command U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan testified before a U.S. Senate committee June 29 that his major goals are to provide security and development assistance while the Afghan government strengthens and takes greater responsibility for its own security.

A reduction of U.S. forces set to begin in July 2011, which [was announced by President Obama](#) in a December 2009 speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, is not a date when forces will be rapidly withdrawn without regard for existing security conditions, General David Petraeus testified.

Petraeus addressed security goals during a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing June 29, and was approved by the full Senate June 30 in a 99–0 vote.

“July 2011 will mark the beginning of a process, not the date when the U.S. heads for the exits and turns out the lights,” Petraeus said. “We’ll need to provide assistance to Afghanistan for a long time to come.”

Petraeus, the commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, was nominated by the president to assume command of U.S. forces and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from Army General Stanley McChrystal, who recently resigned.

“We cannot allow al-Qaida or other transnational extremist elements to once again establish sanctuaries from which they can launch attacks on our homeland or on our allies,” Petraeus testified. “Achieving that objective, however, requires that we not only counter the resurgent Taliban elements who allowed such sanctuaries in the past,” but “we must also help our Afghan partners develop their security forces and governance capacity so that they can, over time, take on the tasks of securing their country and seeing to the needs of their people.”

In addition to the U.S. forces, the ISAF coalition forces come from 46 countries, while many other nations provide economic assistance.

Once an additional 9,000 forces from other nations are fully committed to Afghanistan, there will be 50,000 non-U.S. forces in the ISAF mission, Petraeus said. The addition of 30,000 U.S. forces, already in progress, will be completed within months, bringing the total number of U.S. troops to 100,000 by the end of August.

“Complementing the military buildup has been the tripling of the U.S. civilian structure in Afghanistan, with substantial additional numbers still deploying,” he said. [The civilian structure is essential](#) for the campaign in Afghanistan to be a fully integrated civil-military effort, one that includes commitments from all U.S. government elements, allied forces and the U.N. assistance mission, and with the support of the Afghan government, Petraeus said. It works, he said, because it worked well in Iraq, where he commanded allied forces.

Petraeus, as the CENTCOM commander, said that he was directly involved in the current strategy that is being used in Afghanistan and that was recommended by his predecessor, McChrystal, to the president.

“As Afghan President Hamid Karzai has recognized and as a number of allied leaders noted at the recent G20 Summit, it is going to be a number of years before Afghan forces can truly handle the security tasks in Afghanistan on their own,” Petraeus testified.

“The commitment to Afghanistan is necessarily, therefore, an enduring one, and neither the Taliban nor the Afghan and Pakistani partners should doubt that,” he said.

Petraeus acknowledged that tough fighting against a resurgent Taliban force will continue and may become more intense in the next few months. As allied forces take away the insurgents’ safe havens and reduce their freedom of movement, they will fight back, he said.

**4. U.N. Ambassador Rice on Security Council Iran Resolution (06-29-2010)
Says 1737 panel plays critical role in monitoring, enforcing U.N. sanctions**

U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York, NY, June 28, 2010

Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Briefing on Iran and Resolution 1737

Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Ambassador Takasu, for your briefing today.

Mr. President, less than three weeks ago, this Council sent a strong message about Iran's nuclear program. Our adoption of Resolution 1929 reaffirmed that this Council will respond decisively to serious threats to international peace and security. That resolution imposed tough, comprehensive new sanctions on Iran. These sanctions reinforce the determination not only of the United States but of the international community to hold Iran to its international obligations and to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.

The 1737 Committee plays a critical role in monitoring and improving enforcement of the Security Council's resolutions. The Committee is our principal mechanism for helping states fulfill their obligations to implement these measures, as well as responding effectively when states violate international law and fail to enforce UN sanctions.

In Resolution 1929, the Council expressed its desire to strengthen this Committee and ensure that it has the tools it needs to be effective. The Council specifically directed the Committee to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of all Iran-related resolutions through a work plan. Ambassador Takasu, we encourage you to personally engage with the Committee to set out an ambitious agenda in this work program. An active and effective Committee will reinforce respect for the rule of law internationally. It can also show the potential of multilateral mechanisms to tackle urgent proliferation threats.

We also encourage the Committee and the UN Secretariat to work together to establish the newly created Panel of Experts. When fully established, the Panel will be our eyes and ears in the field. In line with its mandate, the Panel will help states fully implement the measures set forth in each of the resolutions on Iran, and it will help the Committee examine and analyze information about sanctions violations. The United States hopes that the Panel can be operational by the end of this summer.

But the effectiveness of the Iran sanctions regime is primarily the responsibility of each and every UN member state, which are obligated to carry out this Council's decisions. The United States has already taken steps to implement our obligations under this resolution, as have other member states. All states must do their part to ensure rapid, effective, and robust implementation. Such action will send an unmistakable message to Iran's leaders and directly support negotiating efforts.

Mr. President, the United States remains committed to pursuing a diplomatic solution and the dual-track strategy on Iran. As the Foreign Ministers of the P5+1 countries made clear in their statement following the adoption of Resolution 1929, we remain ready to engage with Iran to address our concerns. We continue to acknowledge Iran's right to pursue peaceful civilian nuclear power. But with that right comes the real responsibility to ensure the rest of the world about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's intentions.

Our goal remains to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. We will continue working closely with our partners in this Council and the international community toward that goal. As President Obama has said, Iran can choose to address these concerns and build a more prosperous relationship with the international community, one based on mutual interests and mutual respect. But if the Iranian government continues to undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peace that it protects, Iran will only find itself more isolated, less prosperous and less secure.

Thank you, Mr. President.

5. Statement on G8 Muskoka: Nonproliferation and Iran (06-26-2010)

Outlines key objectives to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons

President Obama recognizes that the threat of nuclear proliferation constitutes one of the gravest national security issues confronting the United States. Since taking office, he has sought to strengthen and revitalize the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Based on the comprehensive strategy that he described in his speech last April in Prague, the Obama Administration is achieving substantial progress on the agenda, including in the following areas:

Nuclear Security Summit: On April 13, 2010, President Obama hosted a Summit meeting of nearly 50 world leaders who agreed to a communiqué and work-plan dedicated to achieving the President's goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world in four years, as well as specific national actions to pursue that goal. This was a critical step forward in the effort to prevent nuclear terrorism, and was backed by concrete steps by a range of nations. A second Summit is planned for 2012 hosted by South Korea.

New START Treaty: On April 8, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the new START Treaty. This Treaty will limit U.S. and Russia to significantly fewer strategic arms and delivery vehicles, while permitting each Party the flexibility to determine the structure of its strategic forces within the Treaty limits. The Treaty demonstrates U.S. and Russian leadership on non-proliferation, while also strengthening our cooperation with Russia more broadly. President Obama has submitted the New START Treaty to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

The Nuclear Posture Review: The NPR was a crucial step in moving toward a world without nuclear weapons. It elevated preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism to the top of the U.S. policy agenda and outlined concrete steps for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy. The NPR changed U.S. declaratory policy to strengthen non-proliferation: The U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

NPT Review Conference: On May 28, NPT parties adopted by consensus a Final Document that advances a realistic path towards achievement of the President's vision for the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This document includes calls for strengthened verification and compliance, recognizes the New START agreement and the need for deeper reductions of nuclear weapons, entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the immediate start of talks on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and supports efforts to pursue international fuel banks and related mechanisms to broaden access to peaceful nuclear energy without creating new proliferation risks.

UN Security Council Summit Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament: In September 2009, President Obama presided over an historic Security Council summit meeting on nonproliferation and disarmament. As a result of this meeting, the Council reaffirmed its support for broad progress to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensure reductions in existing weapons stockpiles, as well as control of fissile material. The Council reaffirmed strong support for the NPT and called on NPT States parties to establish clear goals for the 2010 NPT Review Conference to strengthen all three of the NPT's pillars -- disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy for all.

UN Security Council Resolution 1887: The U.S. presidency of the UN Security Council and President Obama's historic Council Summit on nonproliferation and disarmament led to the unanimous passage of UN Security Council resolution 1887 on September 24, 2009. This resolution reaffirmed the international community's commitment to the global nonproliferation regime based on the NPT, expressed the unified view that all countries enjoy rights and responsibilities under the NPT, and signaled particular concern that all countries need to comply with their obligations. Resolution 1887 also reinforced ongoing work based on UNSC Resolution 1540 to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

Global Partnership: In Muskoka, the G-8 reaffirmed their commitment to joint efforts to address global threats, which will ensure the G-8 will continue its support for important initiatives like the Global Partnership against Weapons of Mass Destruction. The U.S. looks forward to working closely with other Global Partnership supporters to advance progress in addressing key priorities such as nuclear and radiological security; biological security; engagement of scientists; and facilitating the implementation of UNSCR 1540. The Global Partnership positions resources to address commitments made at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and provides the financial basis for international cooperation to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years.

The international community's reinvigorated commitment to the global nonproliferation regime and President Obama's accomplishments based on the principled approach of "rights and responsibilities" have strengthened the world's resolve to address the challenge of Iran's nuclear program and Iran's failure to fulfill its obligations.

-- Since taking office, President Obama has pursued a new and more effective approach that has broadened the scope of U.S. and multilateral efforts to confront the Iranian government with a clear choice: advance its own security and prosperity by living up to its obligations, or face growing consequences and deeper isolation.

-- Our comprehensive strategy has produced a stronger global determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and persuade Iran to engage seriously with the international community. These accomplishments include:

- The adoption of UNSC resolution 1887 in September 2009 reaffirming the rights and responsibilities of the global nonproliferation regime, which demonstrated Iran is an outlier of the international nonproliferation system;
- The strong November 2009 resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors censuring Iran for pursuing a secret nuclear enrichment facility – the first such resolution since 2006;

- The December 2009 European Council declaration that the EU would support action by the UNSC if Iran continues to not cooperate with the international community over its nuclear program, and that the EU stands ready to take the necessary steps to accompany the UNSC process;
 - UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which established the toughest and most comprehensive sanctions on Iran to date by building on three previous rounds of UN sanctions, expanding existing measures, targeting new entities and individuals, and breaking new ground in several new areas of proliferation concern;
 - The June 17, 2010 declaration by European Union Heads of State that the EU will adopt strong measures to implement and accompany UN Security Council resolution 1929, including on trade, financial, banking and insurance, transport, and oil and gas sectors as well as new visa bans and asset freezes;
 - The announcement by Australia of additional steps that it is taking pursuant to resolution 1929, including in banking and shipping and against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and;
 - The announcement by the U.S. Treasury of a new set of U.S. designations targeting Iran's nuclear and missile programs to begin to implement resolution 1929 and expand upon actions mandated by the Security Council, which focus on Iran's use of its financial sector, shipping industry, and the IRGC to support its proliferation activities.
 - The United States Congress earlier this week passed comprehensive legislation aimed at holding Iran accountable for failing to meet its international obligations, and complementing the multilateral strategy. The Administration is committed to implementing this legislation fully in a manner that advances our multilateral dual-track strategy of engagement and pressure.
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6. State's Gottemoeller on U.S., Russian Common Vision of Security (06-25-2010) **Says New START Treaty is important to both countries' security**

U.S. Department of State, Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Ploughshares Fund-PIR Centre Conference, Moscow, Russia

Shaping a Common Vision of Security between Russia and the United States

Introduction

Good afternoon. Thank you for inviting me to participate in this conference. The timing of this meeting could not have been better coming so soon after the successful meeting yesterday between President Obama and President Medvedev in Washington.

I note that the previous time our Presidents met was on April 8, in Prague, when they signed the New START Treaty and that is what I am here to discuss. While the signing of the Treaty marked the end of the negotiation between the U.S. and Russia – a process that took a little under a year – it also marked the beginning of the critical ratification phase. Before I discuss the Treaty itself, I would like to start by commenting on the progress that has been made in gaining the advice and consent to ratification by the United States Senate.

Ratification Update

First, I am pleased to report that much has happened since the Treaty was signed in early April. We worked quickly to prepare the Treaty ratification package for the United States Senate and this package was submitted to the Senate by the White House in mid-May.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the leadership of Senator John Kerry, who chairs the Committee and Senator Richard Lugar, who is the ranking member, arranged an aggressive schedule of hearings ensuring a timely and thorough review of the Treaty. To date, the Committee has held 10 hearings on New START.

The hearings got off to a very strong start when Secretary of State Clinton, Defense Secretary Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, appeared together before the committee and provided powerful testimony in support of the Treaty noting its importance to U.S. national security. I, along with Dr. Ted Warner of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who was a Deputy Head of Delegation during the Treaty negotiations, testified twice before the Committee.

The Committee also heard from Dr. Jim Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Lt. General Patrick O'Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, and General Kevin Chilton, Commander of the United States Strategic Command.

In addition to administration officials, the Committee has heard from former government officials and military leaders including former Secretaries of Defense Bill Perry and Jim Schlesinger, former Secretaries of State James Baker and Henry Kissinger and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.

Last week, Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Chairman Mullen, who were joined by Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, made another joint appearance, this time before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In addition to the testimony and questions posed by Senators during hearings, Senators have been briefed extensively on the Treaty and the Administration has responded to hundreds of questions submitted by senators. As I said, New START is getting a thorough vetting and we will continue to answer any and all questions by the members of the Senate as this process continues.

Senator Kerry has announced that he intends to put forth the "resolution of ratification" for a full Committee vote before the Senate takes its August break.

I believe there is every reason for the Senate to provide its advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty. The Treaty is a continuation of the international arms control and nonproliferation framework that the United States has worked hard to foster and strengthen for the last 50 years. It will provide ongoing transparency and predictability regarding the world's two largest nuclear arsenals, while preserving our ability to maintain the strong nuclear deterrent that remains an essential element of U.S. national security and the security of our allies and friends.

Negotiating New START

I would like to take a few steps back and talk about how we got to this point. It was a little over a year ago that we set out to negotiate the New START Treaty with the goal of replacing the expiring START Treaty with a new agreement mandating lower levels of strategic offensive arms. We were also determined to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in our relations with Russia.

The negotiations benefitted from our long experience with implementing the INF Treaty, the START Treaty and the Moscow Treaty as well as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The New START Treaty is a hybrid of START and the Moscow Treaty – New START has its conceptual roots in both treaties. It contains a comprehensive verification regime as did START, to provide predictability, but it recognizes that we are no longer in a Cold War relationship. Thus, it allows each Party to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms and how reductions will be made. This flexibility is the great contribution of the Moscow Treaty, and it will be important to the national security of both countries as we move forward to further reductions.

A few points about New START:

- The new Treaty establishes limits for U.S. and Russian nuclear forces significantly below the levels established by the START and Moscow Treaties.
- It should be noted that what is counted under each treaty is different.
- While the START Treaty relied primarily on attribution rules for counting warheads on delivery vehicles, in the New START Treaty we sought to count the actual number of warheads emplaced on each deployed ICBM and SLBM.
- For nuclear-capable heavy bombers, rather than count these heavy bombers at zero warheads to reflect the fact that today nuclear weapons are rarely loaded on them, the sides agreed to an attribution rule of one warhead per nuclear-capable heavy bomber.
- The new treaty will limit deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 per side, which is about 30% below the maximum of 2,200 warheads permitted by the Moscow Treaty.
- The Treaty has a limit of 700 on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
- This limit is more than 50 percent below the START Treaty limit of 1,600 deployed strategic delivery vehicles.
- There will be a separate limit of 800 on the total number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.

The verification regime includes extensive provisions that contribute to verification of the Parties' compliance, including notifications, data exchanges, agreed conversion and elimination procedures, inspections, demonstrations, and exhibitions. It also includes some significant innovations over the START verification regime, such as the provision of unique identifiers for all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and reentry vehicle onsite inspections that are designed to monitor the exact number of reentry vehicles emplaced on individual missiles selected for inspection.

The verification regime will provide each Party confidence that the other is upholding its obligations, while also being simpler and less costly to implement than START. The regime reflects the improved U.S.-Russian relationship since the end of the Cold War and reduces the disruptions to operations at strategic nuclear force facilities as occurred under START.

Spirit of the Negotiations

I would like to talk for a moment about the spirit in which these negotiations took place, a spirit that was best defined as one of mutual respect. It was due to this spirit that our meetings were always “businesslike and productive”—or as Ambassador Antonov would frequently say, “business is business.”

Each delegation member brought to the table a sense of purpose and cooperation that allowed us to complete the Treaty in a year – a span of time that is in sharp contrast to the more than nine years it took to negotiate the START I Treaty and the six years it took to negotiate the INF Treaty.

Much has changed since START was signed by President Bush and President Gorbachev in 1991. These changes were reflected in the day-to-day work of our delegations. When our delegations sat across the table from each other, we had a better understanding of the other’s strategic forces. This was borne of the experience implementing INF and START. In fact, many of the U.S. and Russian experts on our delegations were inspectors under START. Multiple times, they had visited each others’ ICBM bases, ballistic missile submarine bases, heavy bomber bases, and storage facilities.

Communication lines are also well-established. For more than 22 years, the United States and Russia have communicated on START and INF through our respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. And we speak each other’s languages. There were probably as many Russian speakers on the U.S. delegation as English speakers on the Russian delegation—many of them, again, from the cadre of inspectors. Arms control treaties of the past were negotiated when we did not have this multi-year implementation experience under our belts, and it helped enormously with the pace of negotiation.

There was a high degree of professionalism and expertise on both sides of the table, and the two teams were able to work together in a very intense and productive way. What we achieved is an agreement that mutually enhances the security of the Parties and provides predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces.

In my view, it is no accident that we were able to complete this treaty quickly. New START reflects the determination of our two governments to begin a new era in our security relations, one of greater openness and cooperation.

Conclusion

This Treaty is not just about Washington and Moscow. It is about the entire world community. As you know, the United States and Russia control more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal and we understand the world looks to us for leadership in securing nuclear material globally and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Although not tied to this Treaty, the recently released data on the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile show how far we have come in reducing the number of nuclear warheads from the stockpile maximum of 31,255 in 1967 to the 5,113 warheads in the stockpile as of September 2009.

Increasing transparency of global nuclear stockpiles is important to non-proliferation efforts and to pursuing follow-on reductions after the ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty. And the new treaty sets the stage for engaging other nuclear powers in fulfilling the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and expanding opportunities for enhancing strategic stability.

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As we say in the preamble to the Treaty, we see it as providing new impetus to the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms with a view to expanding this process in the future to a multilateral approach. We will also seek to include non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons in future reductions. Such steps would truly take arms control into a new era.

The New START Treaty continues a narrative begun near the end of the Cold War that recognizes the need to eliminate the paralyzing threat of nuclear war by reducing – and ultimately eliminating – nuclear weapons.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee the defense of our allies. But with this new Treaty, we are setting the stage for further arms reductions.

I would like to conclude with the words of our Presidents who described it best when, after signing the new Treaty, President Obama called it “an important milestone for nuclear security and non-proliferation, and for U.S.-Russia relations” and President Medvedev declared it a “win-win situation.”

Thank you.
